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In	December	2016,	the	Grand	Chamber	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	delivered	a
seminal	judgement	on	immigration	detention	(Khlaifia	and	others	v.	Italy,	application	no.
16483/12).	The	case	concerned	the	pre-admittance	detention	and	subsequent	expulsion	of
three	migrants	who	arrived	in	Italy	by	sea	in	September	2011,	following	the	‘Arab	Spring’
events	in	Tunisia.	The	migrants	were	intercepted	by	the	Italian	coastguard	and	transferred
to	the	‘Early	reception	and	aid	centre’	(CSPA)	located	on	the	island	of	Lampedusa,	where
they	were	kept	for	few	days.	When	the	centre	was	partially	destroyed	by	a	fire,	the	migrants
where	transferred	aboard	two	ships	moored	in	the	Palermo	harbour,	always	under	the
custody	of	border	authorities.	Finally,	they	were	returned	to	Tunisia.	The	European	Court	of
Human	Rights	found,	inter	alia,	a	violation	of	art.	5	of	the	Convention,	for	the	migrants	had
been	illegally	deprived	of	their	personal	liberty	within	both	the	centre	and	the	ships.
In	August	2018,	the	case	of	the	migrants	held	on	the Diciotti	Italian	military	ship	inflamed
the	public	debate	in	Italy	yet	another	time.	More	than	one	hundred	people	coming	from
Eritrea	and	other	African	countries	were	rescued	at	high	sea	by	patrol	boats	of	the	Italian
coastguard	and	immediately	transferred	aboard	a	larger	boat,	Diciotti.	The	Italian
Government	granted	to	Diciotti	the	permission	to	dock	in	Catania	harbour;	however,	for
several	days	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior	refused	to	let	migrants	disembark,	claiming	that
the	EU,	and	not	Italy	alone,	should	take	care	of	people	arrived	from	Africa	by	boat.
What	do	the	two	cases	–	Khlaifia	and	Diciotti	–	have	in	common?	And,	more	importantly,	is
the	Khlaifia	ruling	relevant	when	assessing	the	legitimacy	of	the	Italian	Government’s
conducts	in	Diciotti?
MIGRANTS	DISEMBARKING	FROM	DICIOTTI
Both	cases	deal	with	migrants	who	were	deprived	of	their
personal	liberty	for	several	days	aboard	a	ship;	in	other	words,	a
de	facto	detention	carried	out	by	border	authorities	without	a
detention	order.	In	the	Khlaifia	case,	migrants	were	detained	for
nine	days;	almost	ten	days	had	passed	before	migrants	were	released	and	allowed	to
disembark	from	the	Diciotti	ship.
That	said,	since	the	binding	effects	of	the	ECHR	rulings	go	beyond	the	specific	individual
case	(see	Grand	Chamber,	13	Dec.	2013,	Paposhvili	v.	Belgium,	application	no.	41738/2010,	§
130),	the	principles	expressed	in	the	Khlaifia	case	also	apply	to	the	situation	of	the	Diciotti
ship.	The	European	Convention	allows	the	use	of	detention	in	migration	management
(Article	5,	§	1,	lett.	f).	Nonetheless,	under	the	same	provision	the	deprivation	of	personal
liberty	is	legitimate	only	if	a	series	of	requirements	are	satisfied:	above	all,	the	detention
order	has	to	be	based	on	national	law,	and	shall	be	validated	by	a	national	judge.	The	Italian
Constitution	provides	that	no	one	shall	be	detained	for	more	than	96	hours	in	the	absence
of	a	judicial	review	(Article	13).	Moreover,	under	the	Italian	law	on	immigration,	the
legitimacy	of	detention	is	attached	to	the	following	requirements:	a)	migrants	can	be
detained	only	for	the	purpose	of	executing	a	deportation	order;	b)	less	invasive	restrictive
measures	to	enforce	the	repatriation	shall	not	be	available;	c)	detention	is	only	allowed
within	‘deportation	centres’	(the	CPRs,	Centri	di	Permanenza	per	il	Rimpatrio;	formerly	CIE,
Centri	di	Identificazione	ed	Espulsione);	d)	detention	shall	be	validated	by	a	judge	in	a
hearing	(see	Articles	13	and	14	of	Legislative	Decree	n.	286	of	1998,	the	Italian	Immigration
Act).	None	of	these	conditions	was	met	in	the	Lampedusa	centre,	nor	on	the	ships	moored
in	the	Palermo	harbour	where	the	applicants	of	the	Khlaifia	case	were	held;	similarly,	none
of	these	conditions	were	met	as	regards	the	migrants	who	were	held	on	the	Diciotti.
The	Italian	Government	has	justified	its	behaviour	with	regard	to	the	Diciotti	case	by
invoking	the	need	to	defend	Italian	borders	in	a	context	of	emergency	allegedly	caused	by
the	massive	arrival	of	migrants	and	by	the	inertia	of	other	EU	Member	States.	Yet,	the	‘state
of	emergency’	argument	had	already	been	rejected	by	the	Court	as	a	justification	for
detention	in	the	Khlaifia	case.	At	that	time,	the	Italian	Government	was	dealing	with	far
more	remarkable	numbers	of	people	migrating	from	North	Africa.	In	fact,	between	January
and	September	2011,	55.000	arrivals	were	recorded,	as	opposed	to	20.000	arrivals	for	the
same	period	in	2018.	In	Khlaifia,	the	Court	emphasized	that	the	aim	of	Article	5	is	‘to	ensure
that	no	one	should	be	deprived	of	his	or	her	liberty	in	an	arbitrary	fashion’,	and	that	such
principle	shall	apply	‘even	in	the	context	of	a	migration	crisis’	(§	106).	Indeed,	if	fundamental
rights	could	be	disregarded	every	time	a	Government	majority	unilaterally	claims	to	be	in
an	emergency	situation,	the	protection	that	they	offer	would	end	up	being	–	quoting	the
European	Court	–	‘theoretical	and	illusory’,	instead	of	‘practical	and	effective.’
Briefly,	the	core	principle	of	the	Khlaifia	judgment	is	that	no	human	being,	with	or	without
valid	documents,	can	be	deprived	of	their	right	to	the	habeas	corpus.	In	light	of	that,	the
conduct	of	the	Italian	government	in	the	Diciotti	case	represents,	at	best,	the	ignorance	of
basic	procedural	safeguards,	as	provided	by	the	Constitution	and	the	European	Convention
of	Human	Rights;	at	worst,	it	is	a	political	choice	to	manage	migration	outside	the
guarantees	of	the	rule	of	law.
Could,	then,	the	migrants	of	the	Diciotti	be	entitled	to	obtain	a	favourable	ruling	before	the
Strasbourg	Court,	just	as	the	applicants	in	Khlaifia?	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	first
we	need	to	consider	the	‘exhaustion	of	domestic	remedies’	rule,	provided	by	article	35	of
the	European	Convention.	According	to	this	rule,	anybody	who	alleges	to	be	the	victim	of
one	or	more	conventional	violations	by	a	State,	shall	first	seek	redress	before	the	national
jurisdictions.	In	the	Khlaifia	case,	the	applicants	demonstrated	that	no	domestic	remedy
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was	available	to	object	the	unlawfulness	of	their	detention;	therefore,	their	application	to
the	Strasbourg	Court	was	considered	admissible.
The	situation	is	slightly	different	with	regard	to	the	Diciotti	case.	In	fact,	Italian	prosecutors
have	charged	the	current	Deputy	Prime	Minister	and	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Matteo
Salvini,	for	the	offence	of	unlawful	deprivation	of	liberty	as	provided	by	article	605	of	the
Italian	penal	code.	If	Salvini	is	convicted,	migrants	will	obtain	a	redress,	thus	losing	their
‘victim	status’	for	the	purposes	of	an	application	to	Strasbourg.	However,	according	to
Constitutional	law	n.	1/1989,	it	is	for	the	Italian	Parliament	to	decide	whether	or	not	the
criminal	proceedings	against	a	government	minister	can	be	initiated.	If	the	authorisation	to
prosecute	Minister	Salvini	is	denied	(which	is	the	most	probable	outcome,	since	he	is
supported	by	the	majority	of	the	Parliament),	then	the	migrants	of	the	Diciotti	could	be
entitled	to	lodge	an	application	before	the	Strasbourg	Court	for	the	violation	of	article	5	of
the	Convention.	If	the	Court	finds	that	there	was	indeed	a	violation,	the	consequences
could	be	twofold.	First,	the	applicants	might	be	awarded	compensation	for	the	non-
pecuniary	damage,	just	as	happened	to	the	applicants	in	Khlaifia.	Second,	according	to
article	46	of	the	Convention,	the	Court	might	decide,	to	impose	to	Italy	the	adoption	of
general	measures	in	order	to	prevent	further	similar	violations	of	article	5,	such	as	the
introduction	of	a	legislation	dealing	with	deprivation	of	liberty	and	its	guarantees	in	the
context	of	pre-admittance	procedures	at	the	borders.
Any	comments	about	this	post?	Get	in	touch	with	us!	Send	us	an email, or	post	a	comment	here
or	on Facebook.	You	can	also tweet us.
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